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RESUMEN 
 
En este trabajo examinamos la robustez del resultado convencional por el cual 
un mayor grado de integración llevaría a unos márgenes precio-coste más 
reducidos (esto es, el efecto pro-competitivo), cuando dos países se integran 
mediante la formación de un mercado común. Proponemos un marco general 
de referencia, con objeto de evaluar en qué medida se produciría el efecto 
pro-competitivo cuando se considera el papel desempeñado por otras 
variables, tanto para un mercado común “pequeño” como para uno “grande”. 
Una vez resuelto el modelo, el margen precio-coste de las empresas 
nacionales dependería de una serie de variables además de los costes 
comerciales frente al país socio, lo que podría compensar eventualmente el 
resultado convencional. 
 





In this paper we examine whether the conventional result of a greater degree 
of integration leading to lower price-cost margins (i.e., the pro-competitive 
effect), would hold when two countries integrate by forming a common 
market. We propose a general framework of reference, in order to assess the 
extent of the pro-competitive effect when the role of other variables is allowed 
for, both for a “small” and “large” common market. By solving the model, 
the price-cost margin of domestic firms would depend on a set of variables 
in addition to trade costs with the partner country, which might eventually 
offset the conventional result. 
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1. Introduction   
The so-called “pro-competitive” effect, i.e., the disciplinary effect of an increased 
foreign competition on domestic markups, stands as one of the main potential outcomes 
of a process of economic integration, according to models of international trade with 
imperfect competition (Baldwin and Venables, 1995). In particular, the higher levels of 
efficiency and welfare, due to this reduction in market power, have been mentioned as one 
of the most important benefits to be reached following the implementation of the Single 
Market Programme in the European Union (EU); see, among others, Flam (1992), Allen, 
Gasiorek and Smith (1998), or Bottasso and Sembenelli (2001). 
 
  The rationale behind this conclusion would be as follows. The removal of trade 
barriers associated with a process of economic integration would mean that the size of 
the relevant market for domestic firms is now greater, so that their market shares would 
decrease. As a consequence, domestic firms would reduce their price-cost margins, and 
then their ability of charging higher prices at home than abroad. In addition, the 
increased competition would entail some industrial restructuring, through the entry of 
new firms into the enlarged market and the exit of the less efficient producers, as well as 
a greater exploitation of economies of scale. All this would result in fewer distortions, 
lower prices, and a higher level of welfare (Allen, Gasiorek and Smith, 1998). 
 
  Some authors, however, have challenged this “conventional wisdom”. For 
instance, Haaland and Wooton (1992) notice that a process of integration does not 
necessarily amount to enlarging the market and hence reducing market power in the 
previously domestic markets. In particular, they conclude that the probability for prices to 
rise, instead of falling, after integration would be greater the higher were trade costs, the 
bias in preferences towards domestic goods, and the degree of concentration in the market 
(i.e., the lower the number of firms). 
 
  The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the conventional result of a greater 
degree of integration leading to lower price-cost margins, and hence falling prices, would 
hold, when two countries integrate by forming a common market. More specifically, we 
propose a general framework of reference, in order to assess the extent of the pro-
competitive effect when the role of other variables is allowed for. To that end, we develop 
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a simple model of pricing behaviour in an imperfectly competitive industry, with three 
types of firms: home, partner or associated, and foreign. The common market formed by 
the home and partner countries is assumed to be either “small” or “large”, namely, when 
foreign variables are taken to be exogenous or endogenous, respectively. By solving the 
model, the price-cost margin of domestic firms would depend on a set of variables in 
addition to trade costs with the partner country. In this way, we would be able to 
establish whether the expected decrease in the price-cost margin of domestic firms 
might be offset by eventual changes in these other variables.  
 
  The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we present a simple model of price 
setting in a competitive industry, where the relationship between the price-cost margin of 
domestic firms and its potential explanatory factors should be highlighted. Some 
concluding remarks are presented in section 3. 
 
2. The  model 
We will develop in this section a simple, partial equilibrium model of an industry where 
firms compete à la Cournot. The model incorporates three types of firms: home (i.e., 
those from the domestic country), partner or associated (i.e., those from the country 
forming a common market with the domestic country) and foreign (i.e., those from the 
rest of the world), denoted by subscripts h, a and f, respectively. Each firm produces a 
variety of a differentiated good, and, for simplicity, all firms are assumed to be of equal 
size; there are nh, na and nf home, partner and foreign firms, respectively. 
 
  Product differentiation is modelled according to the approach of Dixit and Stiglitz 
(1977). The representative consumer in each country maximizes her utility, given by the 
quantity index: 














α + α + α = f f f a a a h h h q n q n q n Q   (1) 
where  q is the quantity consumed of each type of variety, σ>1 is the elasticity of 
substitution among varieties, and α is a parameter indicating the extent of idiosyncratic 
tastes [extending Warnock’s (1998) specification to the case of three types of varieties]. 
The α’s are normalized to add one, so that no bias in preferences would appear when αh 
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= αa = αf =
3
1
; we will assume a bias in preferences towards home over partner goods, 
and towards partner over foreign goods, which would occur when αh >
3
1
, and αh > αa > 
αf. The price index dual to (1) is: 
[] σ − σ − σ − σ − α + α + α = 1
1
1 1 1
f f f a a a h h h p n p n p n P     (2) 
where p is the price of each type of variety. 
 
  Given the budget constraint: 
f f f a a a h h h q p n q p n q p n PQ Y + + = =     (3) 
where Y is the (fixed) total expenditure on differentiated products, maximization of (1) 
subject to (3) leads to the following demand function for every type of variety: 
f a h i Q P p q i i i , , = α =
σ σ −     (4) 
whose inverse function is: 
f a h i Y Q q p i i i , ,
1 1 1




σ     (5) 
 
Now, we can find from (5) the (absolute value of the) perceived elasticity of 
demand, η, for every type of variety, by first computing its inverse:  












































i =  is the market share for each type of firm (i = h, a , f ), and 
1 = + f a a s n s n + f h hs n . 
 
Profit-maximizing firms set prices as a markup over marginal costs. Denoting by 















which, after replacing ηh from (6), becomes: 
3 centrA:


















     (7) 
 

















     (8) 
where ta = (1 + τa) is the trade cost faced by partner firms, being τa the ad valorem cost.  
 
Finally, regarding foreign firms, and in analogy with the case of a monetary 
union in open economy macroeconomics (Bajo-Rubio and Díaz-Roldán, 2001), two 
alternative assumptions can be made on the size of the common market formed by the 
home and partner countries. More specifically, the common market can be either 


















     (9) 
where tf = (1 + τf) is the trade cost faced by foreign firms, being τf the ad valorem cost.  
 
Notice, on the other hand, that market shares can be expressed from (4) and (5) 
as [see equation (2.4) in Baldwin and Venables (1995, p. 1607)]: 















and, replacing P from (2) for i = h, a, and f: 
σ − σ − σ −
σ −
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s     (10) 
σ − σ − σ −
σ −





f f f a a a h h h
a a
a
p n p n p n
p
s     (11) 
σ − σ − σ −
σ −





f f f a a a h h h
f f
f
p n p n p n
p
s     (12) 
 
From here, the models for the small and large common market would be as 
follows. 
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Small common market 
The model for the small common market would be made of four equations: (7), (8), 
(10), and (11); with four endogenous variables: ph, pa, sh, sa. Solving the system for ph, 





PCM =       ( 1 3 )  
and replacing the solution for ph in (13), we would get an equation for PCMh as a 
function µ of the elasticity of substitution, the bias in preferences towards domestic and 
partner varieties (remember that αf  = 1 − αh − αa), the number of firms, trade costs for 
partner firms, the foreign firms’ price, and marginal costs: 
( ) a h f a f a h a h h c c p t n n n PCM , , , , , , , , , α α σ µ =      (14) 
In this equation, a regional integration agreement, such as the formation of a common 
market, would be reflected in a decrease in (and the eventual elimination of) ta. 
 
Since the p’s enter in an exponential way in equations (10) and (11), the solution 
to the system has been found by fully differentiating the model, so that the multipliers 
associated to each explanatory variable would be elasticities of the price-cost margin 





































































10 9 8 7
6 5 4 3 2 1
1
(15) 
where: D > 0, N1   0, N
<
>
2   0, N
<
>
3   0, N
<
>
4 < 0, N5 < 0, N6 < 0, N7 = N10 > 0, N8 > 0, N9 > 
0; the exact definition of  D and the N’s is given in the Appendix. 
  
Therefore, according to (15), the price-cost margin of domestic firms would 
depend on: 
•  the elasticity of substitution among varieties (σ), with an ambiguous sign; 
•  the parameters indicating the bias in preferences towards domestic and partner 
varieties (αh, and αa), with an ambiguous sign; 
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•  the number of (home, partner, and foreign) firms operating in the domestic 
market (nh, na, and nf), negatively; 
•  the trade costs faced by partner firms (ta), positively; 
•  the price charged by foreign firms (pf), positively; and 
•  the marginal costs of (home and partner) producers (ch, and ca), positively. 
 
Large common market 
If a large common market is assumed instead, (7) to (12) would form a system of six 
equations with six endogenous variables, namely, the prices and market shares of the 
three types of firms. As before, PCMh would be a function of the exogenous variables: 
( ) f a h f a f a h a h h c c c t t n n n PCM , , , , , , , , , , α α σ µ =      (14’) 
where a regional integration agreement would be reflected again in a decrease in (and 
the eventual elimination of) ta. Notice that, unlike the small common market case, two 
new exogenous variables would appear, namely, tf and cf , which would replace pf. 
 










































































11 10 9 8 7
6 5 4 3 2 1
1
(15’) 
where  D  > 0,  1 N    0, 
<
>
2 N    0, 
<
>
3 N    0, 
<
>
4 N  < 0,  5 N  < 0,  6 N  < 0,  7 N  =  10 N  > 0, 
8 N  =  11 N  > 0,  9 N  > 0, and the exact definition of D  and the N ’s is given again in 
the Appendix. Hence, the price-cost margin of domestic firms would depend in the large 
common market case, on: 
•  the elasticity of substitution among varieties (σ), with an ambiguous sign; 
•  the parameters indicating the bias in preferences towards domestic and partner 
varieties (αh, and αa), with an ambiguous sign; 
•  the number of (home, partner, and foreign) firms operating in the domestic 
market (nh, na, and nf), negatively; 
•  the trade costs faced by partner and foreign firms (ta, and tf), positively; and 
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•  the marginal costs of (home, partner, and foreign) producers (ch, ca, and cf), 
positively. 
 
As can be seen, the results for the small and large common market (leaving aside 
the more complex coefficients found for the latter case) are fairly analogous, with tf and 
cf replacing pf. Hence, we will centre our comments in the perhaps more realistic case of 
a large common market (think, e.g., of the Single Market in the EU).  
 
A regional integration agreement would lead, ceteris paribus, to an 
unambiguous fall in the price-cost margin of home firms (i.e., the pro-competitive 
effect). However, it is possible that this result could be offset by changes in other 
variables. Leaving aside changes in both the elasticity of substitution and preferences 
regarding domestic and partner goods, which show an ambiguous effect on the price-cost 
margin, and should rather occur in the long term, the possibility of a reversion of the pro-
competitive effect would be higher if: 
•  a greater integration with the partner country is accompanied by an increase 
in the trade barriers borne by firms from the rest of the world; 
•  the number of (home, partner, and foreign) firms operating in the domestic 
market decreases; or 
•  the marginal costs of (home, partner, and foreign) producers increases. 
 
Regarding marginal costs, it does not seem too clear their relationship with 
integration; and even a reduction in marginal costs, rather than an increase, might be 
expected following an increase in productive efficiency after integration. More relevant 
would seem the role of trade barriers against the rest of the world: if a process of 
integration is to be accompanied with a higher degree of protection towards third 
countries’ firms, by decreasing the market share of these firms and increasing that of 
home firms, this would lead to an increase in the price-cost margin of home firms. And 
the same would happen if the increased competition associated with a process of 
integration leads to a net exit of firms into the enlarged market. This point would be of a 
crucial importance, since a process of integration can generate a number of sometimes 
conflicting effects that might lead to the number of both home and foreign firms to 
either increase or decrease; see, e.g., the discussion in Markusen and Venables (1999). 
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Therefore, the effect of integration on the price-cost margin of home firms (i.e., the extent 
of the pro-competitive effect) would be ambiguous on theoretical grounds, once the 
possibility of changes in other variables following a process of integration is recognised, 
and would turn to be an empirical question. 
 
3. Concluding  remarks 
We have examined in this paper to what extent the conventional result claiming that a 
greater degree of integration would lead to lower price-cost margins, and hence falling 
prices, actually holds, when two countries integrate by forming a common market. We 
have proposed a general framework of reference, in order to assess the extent of the pro-
competitive effect when the role of other variables is allowed for. To that end, we have 
developed a simple model of pricing behaviour in an imperfectly competitive industry, 
with three types of firms: home, partner or associated, and foreign. The common market 
formed by the home and partner countries has been assumed either “small” or “large”, 
namely, when foreign variables were taken to be exogenous or endogenous, 
respectively. Once solved the model, the price-cost margin of domestic firms depended, 
in addition to trade costs with the partner country, on several other variables, such as the 
elasticity of substitution among varieties, the bias in preferences towards domestic and 
partner goods, the number of firms operating in the domestic market, trade costs with 
the foreign country, and the marginal costs of firms. In particular, price-cost margins 
might increase following a process of integration if the latter were accompanied with a 
higher degree of protection towards third countries’ firms; or, alternatively, if the 
increased competition would lead to a net exit of firms into the enlarged market.  
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Small common market 
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